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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action by appellant (plaintiff) to collect benefits
under a policy of disability insurance written by respondent (defendant).
Appellant allowed the policy to expire by failing to pay the premium when
the same became due. After the policy was out of force and two days
after the appellant had suffered a heart attack and was confined in
a local hospital, someone on his behalf, tendered the prenium to a clerk
at the office of the local agent of respondent.
The issue presented to the Court below and on this appeal,
is whether appellant was entitled to retroactive coverage.

DISPOSITION BELOW

Summary judgment was granted to respondent by Judge Marcellus K.
Snow.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Affirmation of the Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Complaint of plaintiff and the Exhibits thereto attached,
set forth all of the factual elements necessary to sustain the summary
judgment. There are no disputed facts. Respondent moves the Court
belcw for summary judgment based upon the Complaint of plaintiff contending
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that respondent is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
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Respondent does not take exception to the facts as stated by
appellant in his brief, but does take exception to the inferences
and argument set forth in that statement. It is, therefore, necessary
that a more concise statement of facts be presented.
The insurance contract forming the basis of this lawsuit
is attached to plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit (A) (R. 6). The
policy was issued April 12, 1973. The quarterly premium was $23.73.
The policy remained in force continuously until February, 1974.
On February 12, 1974, a quarterly premium became due, but was not
paid. The policy contains a standard grace period which reads:
"Unless the company has given notice of its intentions
not to renew this Policy as provided on the face of the
Policy a grace period of 31 days will be granted for the
payment of each premium falling due after the first premium
during which grace period the Policy shall continue in force."
There is no evidence that a premium was paid or tendered during the
grace period and hence, the policy lapsed and was out of force at
the latest on March 15, 1974.
On March 25, 1974, appellant suffered a disabling heart attack
and was confined in a local hospital.
On March 27, 1974, two days after appellant had suffered his
heart attack, someone on his behalf, went to the office of defendant's
agent and tendered the quarterly premium. A receipt for the premium was
given and is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit (C) (R. 11).
Some time following the expiration of the grace period, appellant
received a "late payment offer" from respondent's agent, Robert B. Leonard.
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The date the "late payment offer'1 was received by appellant is not
in evidence, but it is alleged by plaintiff that the premium was
tendered on the 27th of March in reliance on such offer. So, we
may assume that the offer arrived on or before March 27, 1974.
The essential fact is that the premium was not tendered
until after appellant suffered his disabling illness. On that date,
the policy was out of force, the grace period had expired.
The issue thus presented is whether the tender of payment
reinstated the policy and if reinstated, the narrow question is
whether it was reinstated retroactively or prospectively only.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS
A MATTER OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
PROPER.
Appellant, under Point II. of his brief, argues that summary
judgment is precluded because (1) the late payment offer can be
construed to extend the grace period and (2) that if not so construed,
the late payment offer can be construed as a waiver or estoppel of
respondent's right to deny coverage (Brief of appellant, page 12).
Appellant's reasoning is fallacious because he ignores the uncontroverted
facts of the case and the elementary legal rationale of sunmary judgment
procedure.
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Appellant pleaded all facts essential to a determination of
this case, i.e., the contract, the fact of nonpayment, the date of
disability, the later date of payment and the "late payment offer".
Examine the brief of appellant.

It is silent as to any claim that

there is a disputed factual matter in this case that will have a
bearing on the ultimate determination, if the case were later tried.
Viewed in proper legal perspective, appellant is simply asking this
Court to "construe" the Late Payment Offer differently than the
interpretation of the trial court. It is elementary that the construction
and interpretation of legal instruments is purely a matter of law for
the Court. A tandem observation is that if the facts are given and
not disputed, there is no function remaining for the trier of fact.
This principle is embodied in Rule 56 UECP:
". . . . Judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
shew that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. . . . "
The Utah Supreme Court in numerous analogous cases, supports
the principle set forth above. Robinson v. Employer's Liability
Assurance Corporation, 28 Ut.2d 163, 450 P.2d. 91. Gibbs v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 22 Ut.2d 263, 451 P.2d. 776.

State

Farm Mutual Autcroobile Insurance Company v. Strang, 27 Ut.2d 362, 496
P.2d 707. Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company, 17 Ut.2d 37,
404 P.2d 33.

F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 Ut.2d 80,

404 P.2d 670. Security Title Company v. Payless Builders Supply,
17 Ut.2d 179, 407 P.2d 141. Mastic Tile Division of Ruberoid Co. v.
Acme Distributing Company, 15 Ut.2d 136, 389 P.2d 56.
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A correlary point that should be considered by the Court
is the assertion of appellant that the legal instruments involved
can be "construed" differently by the appellate court. A fundamental
rule of appellate procedure which defeats appellant's position, is
that an appellate court should not substitute its judgment as to the
construction and interpretation of written instruments for that of
the trial court, unless clearly erroneous.
Appellant does not claim error. His claim is only that he
lost below and that he would like this court to interpret the evidence
differently.

See Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association 24 U.2d 292.

POINT II.
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PREMIUM AFTER THE DATE
OF DISABILITY, DID NOT PROVIDE RETROACTIVE
COVERAGE.
The true inquiry in this case, is the reinstatement clause
of the policy. The question is whether the acceptance of the premium
by the agent of respondent, reinstated the policy and if it did, was
the reinstatement retroactive.
The relationship between an insurance company and its policy
holder is first governed by applicable statute and second, by the
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terms of the contract existing between them.

In the State of Utah,

the legislature in adopting its insurance code, has provided seme
very specific provisions in the matter of accident and sickness
policies. Title 31-33-7 provides that such policy must contain
the following provisions:
"Reinstatement. — provision as follows: REINSmiEMENT:
If any renewal premium be not paid within the time granted
the insured for payment, a subsequent acceptance of premium
by the insurer or by any agent duly authorized by the insurer
to accept such premium, without requiring in connection
therewith an application for reinstatement, shall reinstate
the policy; provided, however, that if the insurer or such
agent requires an application for reinstatement and issues
a conditional receipt for the premium tendered, the policy
will be reinstated upon approval of such application by the
insurer or, lacking such approval, upon the forty-fifth day
following the date of such conditional receipt unless the
insurer has previously notified the insured in writing of
its disapproval of such application. The reinstated policy
shall cover only loss resulting from such accidental injury
as may be sustained after the date of reinstatement and
loss due to such sickness as may begin more than ten days
after such date. In all other respects the insured and insurer
shall have the same rights thereunder as they had under the
policy immediately before the due date of the defaulted premium,
subject to any provisions endorsed hereon or attached hereto
in connection with the reinstatement. Any premium accepted
in connection with a reinstatement shall be applied to a
period for which premium has not been previously paid, but
not to any period more than sixty days prior to the date of
reinstatement.
The last sentence of the above provision may be emitted
from any policy which the insured has the right to continue
in force subject to its terms by the timely payment of premium
until at least age fifty, or, in the case of a policy issued
after age 44, for at least five years from its date of issue."
(Emphasis added)
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The policy in this case (Exhibit "A" to the Complaint) follows
the statute almost verbatim it reads:
"Reinstatement: If any renewal premium is not paid
within the time granted the insured for payment, a subsequent
acceptance of premium by the Company or by an agent duly authorized
by the Company to accept such premium, without requiring an
application for reinstatement, will reinstate the Policy,
provided, however, that if the Company or such agent requires
an application for reinstatement and issues a conditional
receipt for the premium tendered, the Policy will be reinstated
upon approval of such application by the Company or, lacking
such approval, upon the forty-fifth day following the date
of such conditional receipt unless the Company has previously
notified the Insured in writing of its disapproval of such
application. The reinstated Policy shall cover only loss
resulting from such accidental injury as may be sustained after
the date of reinstatement and loss due to such sickness as
may begin more than five days after such date. In all other
respects the insured and Company shall have the same rights
thereunder as they had under the Policy immediately before
the due date of the defaulted premium, subject to any provisions
endorsed hereon or attached hereto in connection with the
reinstatement."
The statutory regulation followed by the policy is clear,
unambiguous and unmistakable. Reinstatement covers only accidents
and illnesses occurring after the date of reinstatement and conversely
does not cover accidents and injuries which occur while the policy
is out of force, as in this case.
Text book authority supports the provision of the Utah statute.
43 AmJur2d, Sec. 394:
"The courts generally agree that in the case of a
lapsed life insurance policy the reinstatement relates back
to the date of lapse. But as to health and accident policies,
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the prevailing rule is that reinstateranet has a prospective
effect dating frcm the time of reinstatement. Accordingly,
the acceptance of overdue premiums after a default for nonpayment entitles the insured to future coverage only, thus
precluding a retroactive application of the premium."
A Utah case of controlling precedence where the foregoing principle
finds expression, is Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters„2 Ut^2d 373,
275 P.2d 675:
"As to the effect of the reinstatement of the policy, the
certificate provides:
" (4) If default be made in the payment of the agreed
premium for this Certificate, the subsequent acceptance of a prerciium
by the Organization or by any of its duly authorized agents
shall reinstate the Certificate, but only to cover accidental
injury thereafter sustained and such sickness as may begin
more than ten (10) days after the date of such acceptance."
* * *

. . . . "As to the October 1st acceptance, the contract
was reinstated in accordance with the provision of the policy;
likewise the payment made on October 31st. Plaintiff must
be charged with the knowledge of her contract and we cannot
find that any belief that the company would accept late payments
as a continuation of the policy rather than a reinstatement
could be reasonably induced by the company's behavior. She
had a right to reinstate subject to the exclusion of any
accident occurring prior to the acceptance of the premium and
could not reasonably have believed that the acceptance of the
premium was to cover the entire period of time preceding."
The statute, the insurance policy and the Utah case on this
subject point conclusively to the fact that the plaintiff had no
coverage. His policy had lapsed prior to the date that he suffered
a heart attack and the heart attack occurred two days before he
tendered the premium to respondent.
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POINT III.
THE LATE PAYMENT OFFER DID NOT EXTEND THE
GRACE PERIOD OR CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF
THE REINSTATEMENT PROVISION OF THE POLICY
OR ESTOP RESPONDENT FROM DENYING COVERAGE.
Appellant admits that the policy with its grace period
clause, reinstatement clause and the Late Payment Offer, should
be construed together, but argues that the Late Payment Offer may
be interpreted to mean that the instrument extended the grace period
and provided continuous coverage, even though the premium payment
was tendered after illness occurred.
Examination of the Late Payment Offer does not lend itself
to the construction contended for by appellant. The key phrase
in the document is this:
"Your grace period expired 30 days after the due date
shown, but this offer gives you an additional 15 days to
pay. . . . if all persons insured are still alive."
Appellant would, of course, be charged with knowledge that
there would be no coverage if payment were made after the insured
died. Certainly, any reasonable person would also be put on inquiry
as to whether there would be coverage if the premium were paid after
disability occurred.

His policy unequivocally states that there is

no coverage for illnesses occurring prior to the date of receipt of
the premium.

The only effect of the Late Payment Offer is to allow
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the insured to reinstate the policy after the expiration of the
grace period without payment of interest, proof of insurability,
or the requirement of additional forms. There is nothing contained
in the offer that would indicate that the company would waive the
reinstatement clause of the policy or in any other manner provide
continuous coverage.
The interpretation contended for by appellant is based purely
on argument. He cites no authoritative case to support his position
that a notice such as the one given in this case, constitutes an
extension of the grace period.
In an analogous situation involving a life insurance policy,
the Supreme Court has discussed the matter of premium acceptance
after the expiration of the grace period, where in the interim, the
company has forwarded notices and letters to the insured.

In the

case of Ballard v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company 21 P.2d 847,
the insured failed to pay the premium and the grace period had expired.
Subsequently, the company wrote to the insured offering to reinstate
the policy or assist him so that his insurance would be continuous.
The insured did not forward the premium until after he became hospitalized
and shortly before he died. The court ruled that the letters and other
activities of the insurance company did not amount to an estoppel or
waiver of the provisions of the policy relative to reinstatement.
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The Court quotes with approval, language from another case
that is particularly appropriate to the case at bar.
"As heretofore observed, let it be conceded that the
adjudicated cases are not in entire harmony. Hence, in following
the one or the other line of cases and in considering the
conclusion to be reached as to whether on the stated facts
a waiver or an estoppel either in law or in fact resulted,
we should be guided and influenced by those thought
to be the better founded on conceded basic and fundamental
principles of law applicable to the subject under consideration.
That principle, as we believe, and particularly here applicable,
is well stated by Mr. Justice Field in the case of Globe
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wolff, supra, that: "Not only should
the company have been informed of the forfeiture before it
could be held by its action to have waived it, but it should
also have been informed of the condition of the health of the
insured at the time the premium was tendered, upon the payment
of which the waiver is claimed. The doctrine of waiver, as
asserted against insurance companies to avoid the strict
enforcement of conditions contained in their policies, is only
another name for the doctrine of estoppel. It can only be
invoked where the conduct of the companies has been such as
to induce action in reliance upon it, and where it would
operate as a fraud upon the assured if they were afterwards
allowed to disavow their conduct and enforce the conditions.
To a just application of this doctrine it is essential that
the company sought to be estopped from denying the waiver
claimed should be apprised of all the facts: of those which
create the forfeiture, and of those which will necessarily
influence its judgment in consenting to waive it. The holder
of the policy cannot be permitted to conceal from the company
an important fact, like that of the insured being in extremis,
and then to claim a waiver of the forfeiture created by the
act which brought the insured to that condition. To permit
such concealment, and yet to give to the action of the company
the same effect as though no concealment were made, would tend
to sanction a fraud on the part of the policyholder, instead
of protecting him against the commission of one by the company."
See also Wood v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 37 P.2d 544
(Utah).
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The position of appellant is that the Late Payment Offer
without more, constitutes a waiver or estoppel against the
insurance. Appellant overlooks the fact that there is no
evidence in this record to shew that the insurance company had
any knowledge that appellant had suffered a heart attack prior to
the time that the premium was tendered. As in the Ballard case,
supra, all jurisdictions in this country

that have ruled on

this question, have stated that knowledge on the part of the
insurer of loss during the defaulted period, is a necessary element
for the claimant to prove before waiver or estoppel can be considered.
These cases are collected in 7 ALR 3d, 414 Sec. 4(a).

CONCLUSION
The facts necessary to a determination of this case, are
in the record and pleaded by appellant in his complaint. The grace
period had expired before the appellant tendered the overdue payment.
Two days before payment was tendered, he suffered a disabling heart
attack. There is no evidence that the insurance company had any
knowledge of the loss on the date that the premium was received.
The record also shews that the premium was returned to the appellant
when knowledge of the loss became known.
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It is obvious that appellant was attempting to retrieve
insurance benefits that he, through his own neglect, had lost.
There is no evidence that respondent had extended the grace
period or waived the reinstatement provisions of the policy. As
quoted in the Utah case of Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, supra,
"A waiver of default in the payment of premiums cannot be based
on a mere expression of willingness to reinstate the policy on easy
terms".
Hence, Summary Judgment was appropriately entered in favor of
respondent.

.*
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DATED this

day of August, 1976.
Respectively submitted,
HANSON ^GARRETT

By S^SlSAAAJ-^
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EDWARD M. GARRETT
THOMAS L. ROBERTS
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Respondent's Brief to Samuel King, King & Schumacher, attorneys
for plaintiff-appellant, at 409 Boston Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 this

y

day of August, 1976.

Secretary
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